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AMERICA AND THE PERMANENT COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE-

By

CHARLES BURKE ELLIOTT*

"It is not a new problem in international relationship. It is wholly
a question of accepting an established institution of high character,
and making effective all the fine things which have been said by us
in favor of such an agency of advanced civilization."
President Harding.
"One dream of the ages has been realized in our time." 3. B. Scott.

O

February 24th, 1923, the president of the United States
sent to the Senate a message urging that distinguished body
to advise and consent that the United States adhere to the Protocol
and accept the Statute of The Permanent Court of International
Justice, which is now functioning at the Hague. "It is," said
the president, "wholly a question of accepting an established insfitution of high character and making effective all the fine things
which have been said by us in favor of such an agency of advanced civilization. . . . Such action would add to our own
consciousness of participation in the fortunate advancement of
international relationship, and remind the world anew that we are
ready for our proper part in furthering peace and adding to stability in world affairs."
N

The message was accompanied by a letter from Secretary of
State Hughes, stating the terms and conditions upon which the
United States may fully adhere and participate, and remain wholly
*President, American (U. S. and Canada) Branch of the International
Law Association, former Justice Supreme Court of Minnesota, and of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
'An address before the Hennepin Bar Association, Dec. 20, 1923.
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free from any legal relations to the League of Nations, or assumption of obligation under the covenant of the league. President Harding's last message to the American people, sent from
his death bed, urged their support of his recommendation, and
President Coolidge, in his message of December 6th, 1923, approved the recommendation of his predecessor.
The question is now before the Senate.
Let us see how this Court came into existence, what it really
is and what the United States is asked to do.
I
Of all the nations, the United States is the one which,
by its traditions, history and racial inheritance, should support
this court. It is a step toward the substitution of law for force
in world relations. Until quite recently, We have posed- as being
a people profoundly imbued with the sense of legality. The
sacredness of law was taken for granted in all economic and
political controversies. The necessity for respecting the law,
whether manifested in the tin star of the village constable, the
judge on the bench or the president of the nation, was never
questioned by good citizens.
Anglo-Saxon and Oriental and Continental history developed
upon different lines. In the Orient and in eastern and southern
and southwestern Europe, government was until quite recently
largely personal, even when not autocratic. The people thought
in terms of an individual ruler, not of an abstract political or
constitutional principle. A king, claiming to act under Divine
authority, governed personally, or through his representative.
There was no separation of the functions of government. The
law was the expression of the will of the ruler, the judge being
merely his agent to declare, and the police to enforce his will.
Some element in the character of the people who lived in the
British Isles led them to reject this idea and develop the principle
that the law was something which had force, by virtue of its inherent nature, entirely independent of its source. For a time,
they retained the theory that the king was the source of law and
justice, but finally the king became merely a symbol for the state,
and law the formally expressed command of the organized community.
The struggle which resulted in establishing the principle that
a free people should be governed by laws and not by men, was
severe, bloody and long, and it was still raging when the ancestors
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of men who founded this Republic left their homes for a land
in which they hoped to be free from personal government.
But where men live in communities, personal interests are certain to conflict and until men become as angels, laws will be
broken. The function of judging individuals and compelling the
observance of the laws is an application of the primary right of
self-defense and inheres in the very conception of government.
Our ancestors in the course of time, succeeded in establishing the
principle that this function should be reserved to and exercised
by judges, sitting in organized courts, who, in the performance
of their judicial duties, should be free from the control of king,
president or other governmental functionaries. The final establishment of the principle of an independent judiciary was one of
the greatest results of the struggle in defense of civil and political
rights. Inevitably respect for the law as law induced respect for
courts as couirts.
The American colonist was an individualist of the extremest
type and the American colonies, through more than a century of
practical isolation, developed an intense state individualism. Local
pride, religious differences and conflicting economic interests led
to conflicts between the colonies which at times threatened, and,
indeed, actually produced war. The tentative form of national
unity devised during the war for independence under the name
of the Confederation, rested on the assumption that each state
was a sovereignty which could not, consistent with its dignity,
appear before a judicial court. But the racial instinct for legality
was already strongly developed and provision was made in the
articles of confederation for commissions to arbitrate controversies between states and before the adoption of the present constitution several such controversies had been submitted to and decided by the tribunal of arbitration thus established. But the
results were not satisfactory, and after much consideration and
great hesitation, the step was taken which transferred the transitory boards of arbitration into a permanent judicial court for
the determination of controversies between the states of the union,
and thus came into being the Supreme Court of the United
States. In its early years, it was flouted, abused and ignored,
and during the first three years of its existence, it had no cases
of any importance to decide. But its authority was finally
established and it is now recognized as the greatest of national
tribunals. The success of that court profoundly affected the
judgment and imagination of Americans. It demonstrated that
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at least most of the controversies between states, like those
between individuals, can be fairly and finally settled in a court
of justice without a resort to arms. That a people who had
devised and were successfully operating that court would seek
to apply the same principle to their controversies with independent
nations was but natural.
But the difficulties in the way of so extending the principle
of judicial determination were very great. The conception of
territorial sovereignty as distinguished from the personal sovereignty of a king or emperor was then quite new in international law, dating only from the Peace of Westphalia which
closed the Thirty Years' War. During the century and a half
from that peace to the adoption of the constitution of the
United States, the idea of the territorial sovereign state had
become thoroughly established and was well on the way to its
ultimate apotheosis in the pre-war German theory that the will
of such a state is the conclusive test of justice and right. A
people accustomed to submitting controversies to an independent
judiciary and familiar with the idea of arbitration found nothing
inconsistent with a proper conception of sovereignty in the
suggestion that nations should submit their controversies to an
external, judicial tribunal which they have joined in establishing.
Of course, the establishment of a real international court with
jurisdiction over states which recognized no lawful restraint
upon their desires was then impossible. The next best thing was
to urge the use of the secondary form of adjudication known as
arbitration.
Thus almost from the beginning of its history, the United
States became an outstanding advocate of the principle and
practice of arbitration. Jay's Treaty in 1794 provided for the
arbitration of the unsettled difficulties between the United States
and Great Britain and since that time, the United States has
signed many treaties providing for arbitration, and been a party
to sixty international arbitrations, of which twenty were xith
Great Britain.
Prior to the Hague Conferences, the machinery for arbitration had to be devised anew for each case, and there was no
uniform procedure. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907
devised what is known as The Permanent Court of Arbitration
with a panel of four members from each nation, from which
arbitrators may be selected, as required for particular arbitral
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tribunals. The establishing of this Arbitral Court was a decided
advance in the movement for the pacific adjustment of national
controversies, and it must not be forgotten that article I of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice expressly
says that "this court shall be in addition to the Court of Arbitration organized by the Conventions of The Hague of 1899 and
1907, and to the special tribunals of arbitration to which states
are always at liberty to submit disputes for settlement."
But American statesmen realized that arbitration was but a
step toward some method of real judicial determination. Its
defects are such as inhere in transitory tribunals, which inevitably
seek to compromise, rather than to decide according to established legal principles.
During McKinley's administrition, Secretary John Hay instructed the American delegation to the First Hague Conference
(1899) to propose the organization of a permanent judicial court.
But Europe had not been sufficiently educated and was not ready
to accept the American suggestion. In the instructions to the
American delegation to the Second Hague Conference (1907)
prepared by Secretary of State Root, we find the following propositions:
"If there could be a tribunal which would pass upon questions between nations with the same impartial and personal judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States gives to questions arising between citizens of the different states, or between
foreign citizens and the citizens of the United States, there can be
no doubt that nations would be much more ready to submit their
controversies to its decision than they are now to take the chances
of arbitration:
"It should be your effort to bring about in the Second Conference a development of The Hague Tribunal into a permanent
tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing
else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision
of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of
judicial responsibility. These judges should be so selected from
the different countries that the different systems of law and procedure and the principal languages shall be fairly represented.
The court should be made of such dignity, consideration and rank
that the best and ablest jurists will accept appointment to it and
that the whole world will have absolute confidence in its judgment."
It was under these instructions that Mr. Choate of the
American delegation introduced the project which finally ripened
into the existing World Court. The Conference finally agreed to
establish such a court, but was unable to complete the work on

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

account of its inability to devise a method for electing the judges
which was satisfactory to both the great and the small nations.
However, it adopted the following resolution:
"The conference recommends to the signatory powers the
adoption of the project hereto annexed, of a convention for the
establishment of a court of -arbitral justice, and its putting into
effect as soon as an accord shall be reached upon the choice of
the judges and the constitution of the court."
Thus the American delegates were successful in having Europe
accept the principle of a permanent judicial court.
President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress of December,
1907, in speaking of the work of the Conference, said:
"Substantial progress was also made toward the creation of a
permanent judicial tribunal for the determination of international
causes. There was very full discussion of the proposal for such
a court and a general agreement was finally reached in favor of
its creation. The conference recommended to the signatory
powers the adoption of a draft upon which it was agreed for the
organization of the court, leaving to be determined only the
method by which the judges Would be selected. This remaining
unsettled question is plainly one which time and good temper
will solve."
After the failure of The Hague Conferences to complete the
organization of the court for the reasons thus stated by President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Knox, under the direction of
President Taft, in an official note, dated October 18th, 1909, said:
"It has been a subject of profound regret to the Government
and people of the United States that a court of arbitral justice
composed of permanent judges and acting under a sense of
judicial responsibility representing the various judicial systems
of the world and capable of insuring continuity in airbitral jurisprudence was not established at the Second Hague Peace Conference and the United States likewise regrets that the composition of the proposed court of arbitral justice has not yet been
effected through diplomatic channels.
"A careful consideration of the project and of the difficulties
preventing the constitution of the court, owing to the shortness
of time at the disposal of the conference, has led the government of the United States to the conclusion that it is necessary
in the interest of arbitration and the peaceful settlement of international disputes, to take up the question of the establishment
of the court as recommended by the recent conference at the
Hague and secure, through diplomatic channels, its institution."
The Republican and Democratic parties by their platform
declarations, are committed to the support of a world court.
Such was the condition of the movement when the Great
War broke upon the world.
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II

The Peace Conference at Paris did not attempt to create a
world court. Article 14 of that part of the Treaty of Versailles
called the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that:
"The Council shall formulate and submit to the members of
the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international
character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may
also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly."
The United States Senate rejected the treaty and thus stepped
out of the procession, leaving the duty of carrying on the work
to the representatives of the fifty-two nations by which the treaty
was ratified. On February 13, 1920, the Council of the League
(composed of representatives of nine of the great powers) under
the foregoing direction, extended invitations to ten distinguished
international lawyers and statesmen, regardless of their nationality or the membership of their nations in the League, to meet
and devise and recommend a plan for the organization of such
a court. This committee was composed of Adatci of Japan,
Altamira of Spain, Fernandez of Brazil, Descamps of Belgium,
Hagerup of Norway, Lapradelle of France, Loder of Holland,
Lord Phillimore of England, Ricci-Busatti of Italy, and Root
of the United States. Elihu Root was invited, regardless of
the fact that the United States was not a member of the League,
because of his distinguished services in connection with the education of the world for the work of substituting law for war.
This committee met at the Hague on June 17, 1920, and
adjourned July 24, 1920, after devising, adopting and reporting
a plan for the court. As recommended by the committee, the
jurisdiction of the court was to be compulsory,2 but the council
was of the opinion that this could not be done under the terms
of article 14 of the treaty, and modified the statute so as to
make the submission of controversies voluntary, unless the individual nations otherwise elected. The plan thus reported contained a complete statute for the court, separate and distinct from
the protocols. 3
On December 13th, 1920, the Assembly of the League, in
which the small nations have a decided majority, by a unanimous
2

See The Permanent Court of International Justice and Compulsory

Jurisdiction, by Dr. B. C. J. Loder, in British Year Book of Int. Law,
1921-22,
pp. 6-27.
3
See Appendix A, page 102.
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vote, expressed its approval of the plan as thus amended and
resolved that as soon as the protocol had been ratified by the
majority of the state members of the League, the Statute should
come into force and the court be called upon to sit in conformity
therewith, for the determination of all disputes between the members or states which had ratified and also by the other states to
which the court is open under article 35, paragraph 2 of the
Statute. It was also provided that the protocol remains open for
signatures by the states mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant,
which included the United States. By this act the League of
Nations did not establish the court, as the Statute of the court,
which was entirely distinct from the Covenant of the League,
had to be accepted by the several nations, acting individually outside of the League of Nations.
To the protocol, there was also an optional clause which was
open to signatures by such nations as were willing to accept
compulsory jurisdiction as originally provided in the Root-Phillimore plan. Under this provision, twenty nations have thus far
accepted, compulsory jurisdiction. The necessary number of states
having ratified the statute, the court became a reality, and in due
courses the judges were elected and held a preliminary session
at the Hague January 30th, a formal opening on February 15th,
1922, and the first regular session June 15th following. Such is
the history of the court, now in session in the Peace Palace in
the noble little city of The Hague, which Senator Moses calls
"the rag doll of European diplomacy."
III
In international law, all sovereign nations are equal, as all
individuals are equal before the civil law. But neither nations
nor individuals are equal in power and influence, and the great
powers hesitate to submit the determination of their controversies
to judges named by the smaller nations. As already noted, the
insuperable difficulty in the way of creating the court had been
in devising some method of electing the judges which would be
satisfactory to the great and the small powers.
The committee of jurists which devised what became known
as the Root-Phillimore plan skillfully took advantage of the
existence of The Hague Arbitral Court with its panel of four
members from each nation, and provided that the four representatives of each nation should nominate not more than four
persons, not more than two of whom should be of their own
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nationality, for election as judges of the court, and that from the
list thus nominated the Council and, Assembly of the League,
acting separately, should, by a clear majority in each body, elect
eleven judges and four deputy judges for the court. As the
great nations are represented in the Council and the small nations
in the Assembly, the vote thus secured would express the will of
both the great and the small nations.
The Statute of the Court provides that it must be "composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their
nationality, from persons of high moral character who possess
the qualities required in their respective countries for appointment
to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized
competence in international law." By this procedure, eleven
judges, citizens respectively of Spain, Italy, Brazil, Cuba, Great
Britain, Switzerland, Netherlands, United States, Denmark, Japan
and France, and four deputy judges, citizens respectively of
Norway, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Roumania and China,
were elected and thereafter duly qualified. As in the appointment
of the committee of jurists, recognition was given the United
States in the court by the election of Prof. John Bassett Moore,
one of the most distinguished living authorities on international
law. These judges serve for nine years and receive salaries
equivalent to about $6,000.00 per annum. At present, the salaries
are paid out of the treasury of the League of Nations with money
contributed by the various nations, members of the League.
The Statute of the Court (article 36) provides generally that
the jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it, and also all matters especially provided for in treaties
and conventions in force and it is this jurisdiction only to which
the United States would subject itself in the event of adherence
to the court. It is purely voluntary and can in no way be
made compulsory without the consent of the nations affected
thereby.
With the provision authorizing nations to consent to compulsory jurisdiction (also provided for in article 36) we are not
at present concerned. Suffice it to say that such nations as sign
the optional provision accept the jurisdiction of the court in all
or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning
"(a) The interpretation of a treaty.
(b) Any question of international law.
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation.
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(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for
the breach of an international obligation."
In the event of a dispute as to whether or not the court
has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of
the court. This is simply the application of the rule that in the
absence of statutory regulation, a court is the judge of its own
jurisdiction.
In exercising its jurisdiction it is provided by article 38 of
the statute that the court shall apply:
"1. International conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
2. International custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.
4. Subject to the provisions of article 59 (which provided that
the decision of the court has no binding force except, between the
parties and in respect of that particular case), judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly considered publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law."
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the court to
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
The statute also provides in outline for the procedure of the
court, leaving the details to the court under its general rule
making power.
When we remember the delay in bringing important matters
before the Supreme Court of the United States, it is encouraging
to note the work already done by this court. No matters were:
submitted at its first formal session, but when the court met; on
June 15th, 1922, ^it found three requests for advisory opinion.
All these questions related to the work of the International Labor
Organization, created by part xiii of the Treaty of Versailles and
under certain other treaties signed at Paris.4 These questions
were disposed of, but with them we are not at present concerned because, as stated by Secretary Hughes, in his letter of
March 1st, 1923, to Senator Lodge, Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, part xii of the treaty is not one of the parts
under which rights are reserved to the United States by our
treaty with Germany, and it is not contemplated that the United
States shall assume any obligations thereunder.
4

See 35 Harv. L. Rev. 245.

WFor a detailed consideration of the questions involved in these advisory opinions, see Professor Manley 0. Hudson's article, The First Year
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In November, 1922, the dispute between Great Britain and
France, as to the nationality decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco
(French Zone) on November 8th, was submitted at the request
of Great Britain and, after a full hearing, was answered in the
negative."
In October, 1922, the court was called upon to determine the
status of the Kiel Canal under chapter 380 of the Treaty of
Versailles, and after a full hearing, the controversy was determined in a decision adverse to the German contention. Other
questions are now before the court, but their consideration is
not within the scope of this address. The fact to be noted is,
-that important questions have-already been submitted and determined by the court.
IV
The court thus established was primarily the work of American
statesmen, and the consent of the other powers, great and small,
to its institution was secured by American appeals and arguments. A distinguished American is a member of the court,
although the United States pays no part of his salary. The
mechanical difficulties in the way of adhering to the court statute
without joining the League of Nations were somewhat difficult,'
but they have been solved by the reservations which accompanied
President Harding's proposal. They are four in number, as
follows:
"1. That such adhesion shall not be taken to involve any legal
relation on the part of the United States and the League of
Nations; or the assumption of any legal obligations by the United
States under the covenant of the League of Nations.
2. That the United States shall be permitted to participate,
through representatives designated for the purpose and upon an
equality with the state members, respectively, of the Council and
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 17 Am. Jour. Int Law

15, et seq.; The Permanent Court of International Justice on Labor Cases,
Sanger,
Proc. Int. Law Assn. 1921, p. 46.
6
The court held that the dispute was not, by international law solely

a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

In commenting on the decision, an

unfriendly critic of the court wrote: "It must be admitted, first, that the
court has been scrupulous and exact in confining its response solely to the
question submitted. It has carefully abstained from any intrusion upon

other functions provided for by the Covenant or which pertain to national

tribunals.
"Secondly, the reasoning is cogent, cumulative and, it should be added,
convincing. It is believed it will meet with the approval of most minds
of sound common sense and legal training.
"Third, the method is broad and comprehensive and has in it little
of conservatism."
Dr.
C. N. Gregory, 17 Am. Jour. of Int. Law p. 305.
7
See Foreign Affairs, for Dec. 1922, p. 71.
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Assembly of the League of Nations in any and all proceedings
of either the Council or the Assembly for the election of judges
or deputy judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
or for the filling of vacancies.
3. That the United States shall pay a fair share of the expense
of the court as determined and appropriated from time to time
by the Congress of the United States.
4. That the statute for the Permanent Court of International
Justice adjoined to the protocol shall not be amended without the
consent of the United States."
With these reservations, it is not possible that the United States
can be committed to any course in the future that it does not
desire, freely, to pursue.
V
Immediately upon the sending of President Harding's recommendation to the Senate, opposition developed on the part of a
faction led by the little group of active Republican senators
which had violently opposed the ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles. These men, however, constituted but a small minority
of their party in the Senate, and it was only by combining with
certain irreconcilables in the Democratic party that they were
able to muster the necessary votes to defeat the treaty. The
majority of the Republican senators, including Senator Lodge,
voted for the ratification of the treaty, including the Covenant
of the League of Nations, with certain reservations. The opposition on the part of the senators to adherence by the United
States to the present court statute seems to be partisan, factional
and personal, inspired by the fear that it may be a step toward
the rebuilding of an international organization and the consequent
loss of their personal prestige. In this opposition we also find
a few very technical lawyers who seek to construe a great international document by the technical rules applicable to a lease or a
building contract and a group of writing politicians and orators
who hope to find an issue which will appeal to the timid part
of the public.
In support of the recommendation of the president and his
secretary charged with the conduct of our foreign affairs, we find
practically all the great organizations through which the instructed
sense of thinking people is expressed, ranging from the United
States Chambers of Commerce, the American Bar Association,
many state and local bar associations, state legislatures, great
national church organizations and the League of Women Voters
to local clubs and societies almost without number. I have yet
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to learn of any such body expressing disapproval. Among the
individuals actively supporting the movement, we find Root, Taft,
Hughes, Coolidge, Wickersham,' President Lowell of Harvard
(referred to by Senator Moses as suffering from an inferiority
complex), and every other college president and minister in the
United States, so far as heard from. To my mind, these gentlemen are better qualified for leadership on such an issue than
even Minnesota's two distinguished senators.
The objections to America's adherence are mostly trivial when
not contradictory. We find it alleged with equal sincerity and
energy that the court is an all-powerful body which will impose
its will upon the nations; that it has no teeth and is so weak
that it will not- be able to enforce its decrees; that it is no court
at all, but merely a board of arbitration; that its decisions might
be accepted as declarations of international law which would not
be satisfactory to the United States; that no international court
should be established until a complete code of International law
has been agreed upon; that the people of the United States are
overwhelmingly opposed to supporting the court, and that, by
adherence, the United States would become a member of the
League of Nations.
Let us see what these objections amount to: It is true that
the court has no physical power to enforce its judgments and
decrees, but this is true also of most courts and particularly of
the Supreme Court of the United States, in cases between the
states of the Union. That court has entered its decree against a
state in a number of cases and while, in the early days, there
were attempts to defy the court, they resulted only in delay, as
public opinion ultimately enforced compliance. The enforcement
of the judgments of tribunals of arbitration rests upon the good
faith of the litigants, and so powerful is this sanction that it
has always been effective. The self-respect of a nation compels
the observance of an agreement to abide the decision in a case
where it has voluntarily agreed to arbitration. That a nation
after formally submitting to the jurisdiction of a court, will refuse
to obey the decree, is inconceivable. Judging by past experience,
there is no reason to anticipate that any nation will refuse to
recognize the binding force of the decrees of this court.
Certainly it is regrettable that no complete code of international law exists, but this is equally true of the common law
which is daily declared and enforced in our courts. To postpone
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the organization of an international court until international law
is completely codified means the permanent adjournment of the
project, because without a coiirt, I fear that we will have to
wait many generations for the desired code. Historically, courts
precede enacted law, and by their decisions crystallize custom and
vaguely recognized principles into formal law. Logically the
court must precede the sheriff as the expression of its power to
enforce its decrees. We may well prefer a court without a sheriff
to a sheriff without a court, which is the present international
condition. Some progress is being made toward codification, but
some years' experience as a member of a committee charged with
the work of formulating such a code has somewhat dampened
.my natural optimism. The difficulties are very great and the
progress is slow. I believe that the World Court will be a most
effective agency in bringing into existence a generally recognized
body of international law, just as the national courts have determined the common law.
It is said that there is danger in submitting our legal contentions to the adjudication of judges trained in other systems of
jurisprudence. This does present a problem, but the danger is
much exaggerated. There are principles of law which are common to all systems of jurisprudence, and they are exactly those
applicable to international controversies. The diversity is mostly
in technical, local law, and procedure matters remote from the
work of a World Court. Neither is the danger that national
prejudice may affect the minds of the judges a serious matter.
As far as humanly possible, the personal and national equation
has been eliminated. Six of the eleven judges (five excluding
the judge from the United States) and all of the four deputy
judges, are nationals of small or secondary powers, and the
manner of their election will enable the smaller states to maintain
that condition if they think it desirable. This objection applies
with much greater force to arbitration than to judicial determination by independent judges acting under a sense of judicial
responsibility.
There seems to be no valid reason to fear that the United
States will be made a victim. The natural instincts and the professional pride of independent judges, the sense of noblesse oblige,
which is so strong in the judiciary, will operate in favor of j.ust
and unprejudiced action. That the court may establish principles
of international law contrary to the ideas of this country is always
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possible, and we must depend upon the reasonableness, justice
and propriety of our contentions, if we expect them to prevail.
The objection which probably seems most serious to many
people, and the only one worthy of serious discussion, is that
adhesion to the court's statute would bring the United States into
the League of Nations whether or not it desires to enter the
League. We have already shown the part taken -by the League
in the organization of the court, and for that work it should
be given the credit. I confess my utter inability to see how the
United States can be made to do anything against its will. As
President Harding told the Senate, Secretary Hughes in his
letter "indicates how with certain reservations we may fully
adhere and participate, and remain perfectly free from any legal
relation to the League, or assumption of obligation under the
covenant of the League."
In his address to representatives of the press on April 24th,
1923, the president said:
"We had no thought of joining the League, we seek none of
its offering, and will accept none of its obligations. The situation
was felt out over a considerable period of time, and when satisfied that there was an appropriate course of action without connection with the League, provided the Senate consented, I proposed adherence to the court protocol and asked the Senate's
consent.

.

.

.

It was pointed out that no rights under the

League would be incurred, but to make certain that we would
not be involved, the letter of the secretary of state suggests suitable reservations to afford ample guarantee."
Secretary Hughes, a former justice of the Supreme Court,
and certainly competent to speak on the question of the construction of the protocols and the statute, says that the court
"is an establishment separate from the League, having a distinct
legal status resting upon a protocol and statute. It is organized,
and acts in accordance with judicial standards, and its decisions
are not subject to review by the League of Nations."
If any American, by virtue of legal learning and character,
is competent to express an opinion upon this question, it is Elihu
Root. In an address last year, as president of the American
Society of International Law, Mr. Root said:
"The Court did not originate in the League of Nations. It
originated in the proposal of the United States to the First Hague
Conference of 1899. Upon the urgency of the United States in
the Hague Conference of 1907 the project was worked out and
agreed upon in its essential features, except the method of selecting the judges. It should be observed that the protocol or treaty
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constituting this court viake it a World court and not a League
court; and especially should be noted that all states, including
the United States, are made competent suitors before the court;
that the citizens of all states, including the United States, are
made eligible for election to be judges in the court, and that all
states which were members of the old Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, including the United States, are entitled
to make nominations which shall form a part of the eligible list
from which judges are to be elected.

.

.

. It is said that by

adhering to the protocol, the United States would in some way
become entangled in the League of Nations to which it does not
wish to belong. This apprehension can result only from a lack
of clear understanding of what is proposed. The protocol recognizes two distinct classes of states,--one, the states that are members of the League of Nations, and the other, states that are not
members of the League of Nations. It is proposed that we
adhere to the protocol expressly as a state which is not a member of the League of Nations. The only obligation we assume
is to pay a sum of money toward the suipport of the court, the
amount to be determined by our own Congress. The only right
we acquire is to have a voice in the selection of judges. We may
or we may not choose to litigate before the court. If we do
choose to litigate, we establish no relations to any one except the
perfectly definite and well understood relations of a litigant in
any court."
As well said by Herbert Hoover:
"The proposals to join the court have been criticized from
various angles. The first of these is that it leads us into some
undescribed political entanglement. This is untrue, for the decrees
of the International Court are based upon the process of law,
not upon political agreement; their enforcement rests wholly on
public opinion and not upon force. In supporting this court, we
subscribe to no compulsion whatever. We do not need to submit
any case t9 the court unless we feel like doing so at the time the
case arises. No other nation can summon us into court except
with our consent. The court itself can not summon us in, nor in
any manner or degree exert upon us any kind of compulsion, not
even moral. Our proposal to enter the court and the act of adhesion to it which President Harding has asked, is based upon
the assumption that compulsion is not necessary for peoples of
good will and a sense of justice."
Personally, I agree with President Butler, of Columbia University, that adherence to the world court would no more make
us a party to the League of Nations than to the Holy Roman
Empire.
A good illustration of the sort of propaganda that is being
conducted by the opponents of the court movement is found in
a recent article by former Senator Beveridge. I have read, it
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with great care in order to learn if there are any reasons why
we should ignore the advice of Harding, Coolidge, Hughes, Root
and others of their standing, and accept the assertions of Beveridge, Moses and Johnson that the court is a creature of the
League of Nations. The writer says that the court was created
by the League, is paid by the League, advises the League, and
is an auxiliary of the League. Not one of these statements is
correct, although each contains a certain modicum of truth.
The fact is that the League appointed a committee of outside
jurists who devised the plan for a court. The nations, through
the old Hague Conference panel of jurists, nominated a list
of judges, and from the list so nominated, the Council and
Assembly of the League elected the judges. The judges are paid
through the offices of the League, but with money contributed
by the nations for that purpose. In its judicial conduct, the
court is as independent of the League as the Supreme Court of
the United States is of the Congress which has power almost
to abolish it.
It is true that it advises the League, but not at all. in the sense
conveyed to the uninformed by Mr. Beveridge's statement.
The rendering of advisory opinions upon questions submitted
to, it by the League is cited by Beveridge as evidence that the
court is a mere annex of the League. It is remarkable that an
American lawyer, and particularly one who poses as an authority
upon constitutional law, should cite this provision as objectionable. Similar provisions obtained in the New England states from
Colonial days, and are now found in the constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, Florida, Colorado, and South Dakota. The Permanent Court of International Justice has adopted rules upon this subject so as to assimilate the process as far as possible to a judicial proceeding, and
especially so as to exclude any supposition that advisory opinions
may be rendered in a diplomatic sense and without publicity.8
The proposition is that we send a representative to the
Council and one to the Assembly, with -authority to participate in
the election of the judges and then retire. "But," says Beveridge, "if we sit for one purpose is it not human nature that
we will sit in for other purposes, and finally for all purposes?"
B. Moore, 22 Col. L. Rev. 527.
As to the nature of advisory opinions, see Perkins v. Westwood, (1917)
226 Mass. 268, 271, 115 N.E. 411; Thayer, Legal Essays, p. 42; Elliott, The
8J.

Legislature and the Courts, 5 Pol. Sci. Quar. 256.
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The answer is quite simple, No. The assertion that sending a
delegate to Geneva to vote on a specific question and then retire,
would imply, or require that he remain for other purposes and
finally for all purposes, requires no other answer.
Certain Senators say that they are in favor of a World Court
(thus rendering lip service to the principle) but against this particular court. They favor the creation of an entirely new court
with no connection whatever with the League of Nations. The
proposition would be reasonable if no court was in existence;
in fact, it is merely the old proposition which the United States
urged upon the Hague Conferences long before the war. To
imagine that the fifty two nations of the world which followed
America's lead to this court, which they are now supporting,
would seriously consider a proposition to toss it into the discard in order to soothe our tender susceptibilities shows a lamentable misconception as to America's standing in the world.
Senator Moses favors "reviving" the old Hague tribunal of
Arbitration ignoring the fact that a live institution does not
require reviving. Of course, all such suggestions are merely
old time devices for defeating a measure by indirection.
The issue should be met by the United States fairly and on
its merits. The court is in existence and is functioning satisfactorily. It is the consummation of long years of American
effort and should receive our support. The objections to America's
adhesion are purely fanciful, based almost entirely on fear that
we may be asked to assume responsibility. Since when has
America become afraid of responsibility?
By adhesion, we assume no obligations under or toward the
League of Nations. We can not, without our consent, be required to submit any question to the court. Our adherence will
add greatly to the moral strength of the tribunal and make it
still more effective as an agency of advancing civilization. It will
not, of course, prevent all war, but it is a useful agency for
the settlement of those irritating and dangerous controversies
which create the conditions out of which wars arise-"a solid gain
to civilization and the peace of the world."
APPENDIX A
PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE
The Members of the League of Nations, through the undersigned,
duly authorized, declare their acceptance of the adjoined Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, which was approved by a

AMERICA AND THE WORLD COURT
unanimous vote of the Assembly of the League on the 13th December,
1920, at Geneva.
Consequently, they hereby declare that they accept the jurisdiction of
the Court in accordance with the terms and subject to the conditions of
the above-mentioned Statute.
The present Protocol, which has been drawn up in accordance with
the decision taken by the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 13th
December, 1920, is subject to ratification. Each Power shall send its
ratification to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations; the latter
shall take the necessary steps to notify such ratification to the other
signatory Powers. The ratification shall be deposited in the archives
of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
The said Protocol shall remain open for signature by the Members
of the League of Nations and by the States mentioned in the Annex
to the Covenant of the League.
The Statute of the Court shall come into force as provided in the
above-mentioned decision.
OPTIONAL CLAUSE
The undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, further declare, on
behalf of their Government, that, from this date, they accept as compulsory "ipso facto" and without special Convention, the jurisdiction of
the Court in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the Court, under the following conditions:
STATUTE OF WORLD COURT
ARTICLE 1. A Permanent Court of International Justice is hereby
established, in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations. This Court shall be in addition to the Court of Arbitration
organized by the Conventions of The Hague of 1899 and 1907, and to
the special Tribunals of Arbitration to which States are always at liberty
to submit their disputes for settlement.
CHAPTER I
ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT

ART. 2. The Permanent Court of International Justice shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to
the highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults of recognized competence
in international law.
ART. 3. The Court shall consist of fifteen members: eleven judges
and four deputy-judges. The number of judges and deputy-judges may
hereafter be increased by the Assembly, upon the proposal of the Council
of the League of Nations, to a total of fifteen judges and six deputy-judges.
ART. 4. The members of the Court shall be elected by the Assembly
and by the Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups
in the Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the following provisions.
In the case of Members of the League of Nations not represented
in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the lists of candidates shall be
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drawn up by national groups appointed for this purpose by their governments under the same conditions as those prescribed for members of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration by Article 44 of the Convention of the
Hague of 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes.
ART. 5. At least three months before the date of the election, the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall address a written request
to the Members of the Court of Arbitration belonging to the States
mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant or to the States which join
the League subsequently, and to the persons appointed under paragraph
2 of Article 4, inviting them to undertake, within a given time, by national
groups, the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a
member of the Court.
No group may nominate more than four persons, not more than two
of whom shall be of their own nationality. In no case must the number
of candidates nominated be more than double the number of seats to
be filled.
ART. 6.
Before making these nominations, each national group is
recommended to consult its Highest Court of Justice, its Legal Faculties
and Schools of Law, and its National Academies and national sections
of International Academies devoted to the study of Law.
ART. 7. The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nominated. Save
as provided in Article 12, paragraph 2, these shall be the only persons
eligible for appointment.
The Secretary-General shall submit this list to the Assembly and
to the Council.
ART. 8. The Assembly and the Council shall proceed independently
of one another to elect, firstly the judges, then the deputy-judges.
ART. 9. At every election, the electors shall bear in mind that not
only should all the persons appointed as members of the Court possess
the qualifications required, but the whole body also should represent the
main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world.
ART. 10. Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes
in the Assembly and in the Council shall be considered as elected.
In the event of more than one national of the same Member of the
League being elected by the votes of both the Assembly and the Council,
the eldest of these only shall be considered as elected.
ART. 11. If, after the first meeting held for the purpose of the election,
one or more seats remain to be filled, a second and, if necessary, a third,
meeting shall take place.
ART. 12. If, after the third ,meeting, one or more seats still remain
unfilled, a joint conference consisting of six members, three appointed
by the Assembly and three by the Council, may be formed, at any time,
at the request of either the Assembly or the Council, for the purpose of
choosing one name for each seat still vacant, to submit to the Assembly
and the Council for their respective acceptance.
If the Conference is unanimously agreed upon any person who
fulfills the required conditions, he may be included in its list, even though
he was not included in the list of nominations referred to in Articles
4 and 5.
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If the joint conference is satisfied that it will not be successful in
procuring an election, those members of the Court who have already been
appointed shall, within a period to be fixed by the Council, proceed to
fill the vacant seats by selection from among those candidates who have
obtained votes either in the Assembly or in the Council.
In the event of an equality of votes among the judges, the eldest
judge shall have a casting vote.
ART. 13. The members of the Court shall be elected for nine years.
They may be re-elected.
They shall continpe to discharge their duties until their places have
been filled. Though replaced, they shall finish any cases which they may
have begun.
ART. 14.
Vacancies which may occur shall be filled by the same
method as that laid down for the first election. A member of the Court
elected to replace a member whose period of appointment had not expired
will hold the appointment for the remainder of his predecessor's term.
ART. 15. Deputy-judges shall be called upon to sit in the order laid
down in a list.
This list shall be prepared by the Court and shall have regard firstly
to priority of election and secondly to age.
ART. 16. The ordinary Members of the Court may not exercise any
political or administrative function. This provision does not apply to
the deputy-judges except when performing their duties on the Court.
Any doubt on this point is settled by the decision of the Court.
ART. 17. No Member of the Court can act as agent, counsel or
advocate in any case of an international nature. This provision only
applies to the deputy-judges as regards cases in which they are called upon
to exercise their functions on the Court.
No Member may participate in the decision of any case in which he
has previously taken an active part, as agent, counsel or advocate for
one of the contesting parties, or as a Member of a national or international Court, or of a Commission of inquiry, or in any other capacity.
Any doubt on this point is settled by the decision of the Court.
ART. 18. A member of the Court can not be dismissed unless, in
the unanimous opinion of the other members, he has ceased to fulfill the
required conditions.
Formal notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations, by the Registrar.
This notification makes the place vacant.
ART. 19. The members of the Court, when engaged on the business
of the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.
ART. 20. Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his
duties, make a solemn -declaration in open Court that he will exercise
his powers impartially and conscientiously.
ART. 21. The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for
three years; they may be re-elected.
It shall appoint its Registrar.
The duties of Registrar of the Court shall not be deemed incompatible
with those of Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
ART. 22. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague.
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The President and Registrar shall reside at the seat of the Court.
ART. 23. A session of the Court shall be held every year.
Unless otherwise provided by rules of Court, this session shall begin
on the 15th of June, and shall continue for so long as may be deemed
necessary to finish the cases on the list.
The President may summon an extraordinary session of the Court
whenever necessary.
If, for some special reason, a member of the Court conART. 24.
siders that he should not take part in the decision of a particular case,
he shall so inform the President.
If the President considers that for some special reason one of the
members of the Court should not sit on a particular case, he shall give
him notice accordingly.
If in any such case the member of the Court and the President disagree, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
The full Court shall sit except when it is expressly proART. 25.
vided otherwise.
If eleven judges can not be present, the number shall be made up
by calling on deputy-judges to sit.
If, however, eleven judges are not available, a quorum of nine judges
shall suffice to constitute the Court.
Labor cases, particularly cases referred to in Part XIII
ART. 26.
(Labor) of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding portion of the
other Treaties of Peace, shall be heard and determined by the Court
under the following conditions:
The Court will appoint every three years a special chamber of five
judges, selected so far as possible with due regard to the provisions
of Article 9. In addition, two judges shall be selected for the purpose
of replacing a judge who finds it impossible to sit. If the parties so
demand, cases will be heard and determined by this chamber. In the
absence of any such demand, the Court will sit with the number of
judges provided for in Article 25. On all occasions the judges will be
assisted by four technical assessors, sitting with them, but without the
right to vote, and chosen with a view to insuring a just representation
of the competing interests.
If there is a national of one only of the parties sitting as a judge
in the chamber referred to in the preceding paragraph, the President
will invite one of the other judges to retire in favor of a judge chosen
by the other party in accordance with Article 31.
The technical assessors shall be chosen for each particular case in
accordance with rules of procedure under Article 30 from a list of
"Assessors for Labor cases" composed of two persons nominated by each
Member of the League of Nations and an equivalent number nominated
by the Governing Body of the Labor Office. The Governing Body will
nominate, as to one half, representatives of the workers, and as to one
half, representatives of employers from the list referred to in Article
412 of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding Articles of the
other Treaties of Peace.
In Labor cases the International Labor Office shall be at liberty
to furnish the Court with all relevant information, and for this purpose
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the Director of that Office shall receive copies of all the written proceedings.
ART. 27. Cases relating to transit and communications, particularly
cases referred to in Part XII (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the
Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding portions of the other Treaties
of Peace shall be heard and determined by the court under the following conditions:
The Court will appoint every three years a special chamber of
five judges, selected so far as possible with due regard to the provisions
of Article 9. In addition, two judges shall be selected for the purpose
of replacing a judge who finds it impossible to sit. If the parties so
demand, cases will be heard and determined by this chamber. In the
absence of any such demand, the Court will sit with the number of
judges provided for in Article 25. When desired by the parties or
decided by the Court, the judges will be assisted by four technical
assessors sitting with them, but without the right to vote.
If there is a national of one only of the parties sitting as a judge in
the chamber referred to in the preceding paragraph, the President will
invite one of the other judges to retire in favor of a judge chosen by the
other party in accordance with Article 31.
The technical assessors shall be chosen for each particular case in
accordance with rules of procedure under Article 30 from a list of
"Assessors for Transit and Communications cases" composed of two
persons nominated by each Member of the League of Nations. ,
ART. 28.
The special chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 27
may, with the consent of the parties to the dispute, sit elsewhere than
at The Hague.
ART. 29.
With a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Court
shall form annually a chamber composed of three judges who, at the
request of the contesting parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure.
ART. 30.
The Court shall frame rules for regulating its procedure.
In particular, it shall lay down rules for summary procedure.
ART. 31. Judges of the nationality of each contesting party shall retain
their right to sit in the case before the Court.
If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of
one of the parties only, the other party may select from among the
deputy-judges a judge of its nationality, if there be one. If there should
not be one, the party may choose a judge, preferably from among those
persons who have been nominated as candidates as provided in Articles
4 and 5.

If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality
of the contesting parties, each of these may proceed to select or choose
a judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.
Should there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for
the purpose of the preceding provisions, be reckoned as one party only.
Any doubt upon this point is settled by the decision of the Court.
Judges 'selected or chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
this Article shall fulfil the conditions required by Articles 2, 16, 17, 20,
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24 of this Statute. They shall take part in the decision on an equal
footing with their colleagues.
ART. 32. The judges shall receive an annual indemnity to be determined by the Assembly of the League of Nations upon the proposal of the
Council. This indemnity must not be decreased during the period of a
judge's appointment.
The President shall receive a special grant for his period of office,
to be fixed in the same way.
The Vice-President, judges and deputy-judges shall receive a grant
for the actual performance of their duties, to be fixed in the same way.
Traveling expenses incurred in the performance of their duties shall
be refunded to judges and deputy-judges who do not reside at the seat
of the Court.
Grants due to judges selected or chosen as provided in Article 31
shall be determined in the same way.
The salary of the Registrar shall be decided by the Council upon the
proposal of the Court.
The Assembly of the League of Nations shall lay down, on the proposal of the Council, a special regulation fixing the conditions under which
retiring pensions may be given to the personnel of the Court.
ART. 33.
The expenses of the Court shall be borne by the League
of Nations, in such a manner as shall be decided by the Assembly upon
the proposal of the Council.
CHAPTER II
COMPETENCE OF THE COURT

34. Only States or Members of the League of Nations can be
parties in cases before the Court.
ART. 35. The Court shall be open to the Members of the League and
also to States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant.
The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other States
shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be
laid down by the Council, but in no case shall such provision place the
parties in a position of inequality before the Court.
When a State which is not a Member of the League of Nations is a
party to a dispute, the Court will fix the amount which that party is to
contribute toward the expenses of the Court.
ART. 36. The iurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specialty provided for in Treaties and
Conventions in force.
The Members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned
in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the
protocol to Nyhich the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment,
declare that they recognize as compulsory, ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of
legal disputes concerning:
(a.) The interpretation of a Treaty.
(b.)
Any question of International Law.
(c.)
The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation.
ART.
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(d.) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.
The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or
on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain Members or
States, or for a certain time.
In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
ART. 37.
When a treaty or convention in force provides for the reference of a matter to a tribunal to be instituted by the League of Nations,
the Court will be such tribunal.
ART. 38. The Court shall apply:
1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
4. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide
a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
CHAPTER III
PROCEDURE

39. The official languages of the Court shall be French and
English. If the parties agree that the case shall be conducted in French,
the judgment will be delivered in French. If the parties agree that the
case shall be conducted in English, the judgment will be delivered
in English.
In the absence of an agreement as to which language shall be employed, each party may, in the pleadings, use the language which it
prefers; the decision of the Court will be given in French and English.
In this case the Court will at the same time determine which of the two
texts shall be considered as authoritative.
The Court may, at the request of the parties, authorize a language
other than French or English to be used.
ART. 40. Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be,
either by the notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute
and the contesting parties must be indicated.
The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the applicatiQn to all
concerned.
He shall notify the Members of the League of Nations through the
Secretary-General.
ART. 41. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers
that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be
taken to reserve the respective rights of either party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and the Council.
ART. 42. The parties shall be represented by Agents.
ART.
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They may have the assistance of Counsel or Advocates before the
Court.
ART. 43. The procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral.
The written proceedings shall consist of the communication to the
judges and to the parties of cases, counter-cases and, if necessary, replies;
also all papers and documents in support.
These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in the
order and within the time fixed by the Court.
A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be
communicated to the other party.
The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of
witnesses, experts, agents, counsel and advocates.
ART. 44. For the service of all notices upon persons other than the
agents, counsel and advocates, the Court shall apply direct to the Government of the State upon whose territory the notice has to be served.
The same provision shall apply whenever steps are to be taken to
procure evidence on the spot.
ART. 45. The hearing shall be under the control of the President or,
in his absence, of the Vice-President; if both are absent, the senior judge
shall preside.
ART. 46. The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall
decide otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not
admitted.
ART. 47. Minutes shall be mane at each hearing, and signed by the
Registrar and the President.
These minutes shall be the only authentic record.
ART. 48. The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case,
shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its
arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.
ART. 49. The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the
agents to produce any document or to supply any explanations. Formal
note shall be taken of any refusal.
ART. 50. The Court may, at any time, intrust any individual, body,
bureau, commission or other organization that it may select, with the task
of carrying out an inquiry or giving an expert opinion.
ART. 51. During the hearing any relevant questions are to be put to
the witnesses and experts under the conditions laid down by the Court
in the rules of procedure referred to in Article 30.
ART. 52. After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within
the time specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any further oral
or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the other
side consents.
ART. 53. Whenever one of the parties shall not appear before the Court,
or shall fail to defend his case, the other party may call upon the Court to
decide in favor of his claim.
The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has
jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim
is well founded in fact and law.
ART. 54. When, subject to the control of the Court, the agents, ad-
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vocates and counsel have completed their presentation of the case, the
President shall declare the hearing closed.
The Court shall withdraw to consider the judgment.
The deliberations of the Court shall take place in private and remain
secret.
ART. 55. All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges
present at the hearing.
In the event of an equality of votes, the President or his deputy shall
have a casting vote.
ART. 56. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.
It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the
decision.
ART. 57. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the
unanimous opinion of the judges, dissenting judges are entitled to deliver
a separate opinion.
ART. 58. The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the
Registrar. It shall be read in open Court, due notice having been given
to the agents.
ART. 59. The decision of the Court has
no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.
In the event
ART. 60. The judgment is final and without appeal.
of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall
construe it upon the request of any party.
ART. 61. An application for revision of a judgment can be made only
when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to
be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown
to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that
such ignorance was not due to negligence.
The proceedings for revision will be opened by a judgment of the
Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that
it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring
the application admissible on this ground.
The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the
judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.
The application for revision must be made at latest within six months
of the discovery of the new fact.
No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years
from the date of the sentence.
ART. 62. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene as a third party.
It will be for the Court to decide upon this request.
ART. 63. Whenever the construction of a convention to which States
other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such States forthwith.
Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings;
but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be
equally binding upon it.
ART. 64. Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear
its own costs.

